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This chapter demonstrates China’s changing and hybrid mentalities of government by 
examining the revival of Lei Feng (雷锋) – a 1960s socialist role model – as the public face 
of a 2012–2013 government advertising campaign to promote civic behaviours, especially 
volunteering. Lei Feng, depicted in Figure 3.1, was a peace-time soldier with the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), who died in an accident in 1962. He became famous in 1963 when 
his life-story, encapsulated in a diary that celebrates Mao Zedong Thought and the ‘socialist’ 
values of altruism, thrift and working hard for public goals, was promoted through a national 
mobilization campaign as a model of socialist citizenship. Media statements by Chairman 
Mao and Premier Zhou Enlai urged the Chinese populace to ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’ 
and to ‘Learn the Correct Class Stance and How to Practice the Revolutionary, Proletarian-
communist Spirit of Selflessness from Comrade Lei Feng’ (‘Zhongguo Qingnian chuban’ 
1963). Subsequent commemorative events have ensured that most people in China are 
familiar with the Lei Feng ‘spirit’ of selfless public service. That spirit is sometimes 
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caricatured as ‘old-fashioned’ through spoofs and the sale of retro-revolutionary fashion and 
kitsch (Steen 2014), and even ridiculed for its ‘brainless simplicity’ (Humphrey 2005: 41). 
However, in 2012, Lei Feng became the ‘celebrity face’ of a two-year-long government 
communication campaign encouraging China’s citizens to adopt ‘good’ civic behaviours. 
 
<Figure 3.1: Comrade Lei Feng Reading Mao Zedong’s Selected Works> 
Source: Photograph by Elaine Jeffreys, Hunan Lei Feng Memorial Hall, 2013. 
 
Lei Feng’s official media presence in 2012 was greater than at any other point in the history 
of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), based on the number of occurrences of the keyword 
‘Lei Feng’ in the online database for the media voice of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
– the People’s Daily – between 1960 and 2013 (Renmin Ribao Dianziban 1946–present). As 
Figure 3.2 shows, Lei Feng became a major focus of national media attention in 1963 (around 
260 hits). Apart from commemorative publicity each decade since then, media publicity 
about Lei Feng increased in 1966, 1977 and 1981 (around 300 hits respectively), temporarily 
peaked in 1990 (525 hits), climaxing in 2012 (579 hits). These dates correlate with specific 
government campaigns: (1) Mao’s 1963 call to ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’; (2) the 
‘official’ start of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966; (3) the 1977 campaign to 
‘smash the Gang of Four’ after Mao’s death in 1976 – the ‘Gang’ (Jiang Qing, Wang 
Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao) were officially blamed for the ’10-year-
disaster’ of the Cultural Revolution; (4) the trial of the Gang for ‘crimes against the people’ 
in 1981; (5) the launch in 1990 of youth education campaigns after the 1989 crackdown on 
protesters in Tiananmen Square; and (6) the 2012–2013 campaign to promote civic 
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behaviours and volunteering, which also commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of Lei’s 
death and Mao’s call to ‘Learn from Lei Feng’. 
 
<Figure 3.2: Number of Hits for ‘Lei Feng’ in the People’s Daily (1960–2013)> 
 
Source: Renmin Ribao Dianziban (1946–present) OriProbe Information Services, Windsor, 
Canada. 
 
Foreign correspondents dismissed the government-led revival of Lei Feng as anachronistic. A 
report by Andrew Jacobs (2012) in the New York Times describes it as ‘old school 
propaganda’ by a ‘ruling party that is struggling to cultivate a sense of legitimacy’, but lacks 
comprehension of contemporary values. According to Jacobs, Lei Feng is a ‘joke’ because he 
only ‘follows marching orders’. In a report for the New Yorker, Evan Osnos (2013) similarly 
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about Lei Feng had bombed at the box office, he concludes that ‘Chinese people, today, have 
learned that getting ahead requires relentless self-definition’, unlike the collectivist-minded 
‘late, great icon of Socialist dedication’ (Osnos 2013). 
 
Such criticisms present Lei Feng as frozen in time, rather than acknowledging the evolving 
nature and political uses of his fame in both the Maoist and reform era. Portrayals of Lei Feng 
do indeed exhibit a sense of continuity through history. But that continuity resides less in his 
identification with Mao-era ideals of unrelenting hard work and self-sacrifice in pursuit of 
revolutionary goals, than in his embodiment of the less grandiose ethical imperative of 
displaying kindness to others. Criticisms of Lei Feng as a ‘brainless’ anachronism have little 
to offer in the way of explanation either for the CCP’s continued (and intensive) use of Lei 
Feng, or for the changing ways in which his persona has been utilized and represented. 
 
An alternative way of making sense of Lei Feng’s contemporary presence is to consider him 
as a postsocialist celebrity. Arif Dirlik (2005: 229–50) coined the term ‘postsocialism’ to 
highlight the hybridity of reform-era China as being a reaction and response to revolutionary 
Maoism and global capitalism, and therefore as both ‘postsocialist’ and ‘postcapitalist’ by 
adopting market mechanisms to correct the entrenched poverty of Mao-era socialism, and 
inserting a self-proclaimed socialist country into global capitalism. It may seem unusual to 
characterize Lei Feng as a ‘celebrity’, since on face value a dead socialist role model shares 
little in common with a contemporary film or pop star. But on a conceptual level, celebrity 
can be understood as an industry-coordinated ‘media process’ and ‘the celebrity’ may be 
theorized as a commodity, text or sign, that is ‘productively consumed by audiences and fans’ 
(Turner 2004: 20). As we demonstrate below, Lei Feng can be conceptualized as a 
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postsocialist celebrity in the sense that he is presented through contemporary commercial and 
media processes as being both a ‘dead famous’ but ‘obsolete’ creation of Mao-era 
propaganda, and a ‘living text’ imprinted with different, and changing, visions (both official 
and popular) of what past, present and future Chinese citizenship signifies. 
 
We use Michel Foucault’s definition of government as ‘the conduct of conduct’ to 
demonstrate Lei Feng’s significance as the historical and contemporary face of government 
efforts to guide citizen behaviours, a referent for ‘counter-conduct’ or resistances to such 
efforts, and a means by which individuals may debate the conduct of others and modify their 
own conduct (Foucault 2007: 191–226). First, we outline the history of Lei Feng and his 
creation, via state-controlled media, as a socialist role model. Second, we trace how Lei Feng 
was dislodged from his original Mao-era incarnation as a new proletarian citizen in the wake 
the PRC’s post-1978 rejection of radical socialism and adoption of market-based economic 
reforms. Third, we explore the reform-era commercialization of Lei Feng and his infiltration, 
via satire, parody and advertising, into the world of contemporary popular culture. Fourth, we 
examine the recent revived and modified use of Lei Feng by the PRC Government to promote 
civic behaviours. Finally, we consider two domains in which this revived use of Lei Feng has 
been prominent: the endorsement of philanthropic activities by entrepreneurs through the 
ascription or appropriation of the title ‘living Lei Feng’; and, the perception of Lei Feng-
linked volunteering and charitable activities by Chinese students. In the latter case, we 
present the results of an online multiple-choice survey of Chinese university students, 
conducted in late 2013, to shed light on how Lei Feng is conceptualized by contemporary 
youth in a period of revived use by government. We conclude that 1960s socialist imagery 
and values have been recast by Party-state organs, through an interplay with the media and 
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popular culture, to promote new understandings of state-society relations, while attempting to 
keep alive the notion that the PRC’s revolutionary history and the CCP matters. 
 
Proletarian role model 
 
The original Lei Feng was linked to technologies for governing the conduct of others and the 
self that were based on three fundamental principles of Maoist politics. The first was the 
‘friend-enemy’ opposition of class struggle (Dutton 2005). The second was a mass-line 
asceticism that aimed to incentivize people living in a poor nation forged after decades of war 
to work hard collectively with minimal resources to create a modern, socialist China. The 
third was the revolutionary creed of ‘serving the people’ (see also Dutton and Hindess, in this 
book). 
 
The friend-enemy opposition framed daily life in Mao-era China (1949–1976) and was 
embedded in life-stories presented for public emulation in the state-controlled media, such as 
that of Lei Feng. Lei Feng became a focus of national media attention on 5 May 1961, when 
the People’s Daily featured an origin story about him titled ‘A Suffering Child Becomes An 
Outstanding People’s Soldier’ (Jun Fen 1961).
1
 The page-four article tells of a poor peasant 
boy being saved by the CCP and becoming an active socialist citizen. It claims that Lei Feng 
was born in Hunan Province around 1940 and was orphaned at the age of six. His father died 
after being tortured by the invading Japanese Army, subsequent reports say he was previously 
beaten by members of the Nationalist Party Army (Zhang Huixin 2009: 5–8). The CCP 
defeated these armies to establish the PRC. Lei’s mother committed suicide after she was 
raped by the son of a local landowner (Jun Fen 1961). His older brother died slowly 
Elaine Jeffreys and Su Xuezhong (2016) ‘Governing through Lei Feng: A Mao-era role model in 
reform-era China’, in David Bray and Elaine Jeffreys (eds) New Mentalities of Government in China, 




following a machinery accident and his younger brother starved to death. The family-less Lei 
Feng roamed the countryside foraging for food until his village was liberated by the PLA. 
After participating in a class-struggle session, where the landlord responsible for his mother’s 
death and other crimes was executed, Lei Feng was placed under the care of local Party 
organizations and went to school. This narrative presents the CCP by implication as a ‘friend’ 
in the struggle of Lei Feng and the Chinese people against their enemies and to realize a 
better life. 
 
The article concludes that Lei Feng, and by extension other citizen-friends of ‘New China’, 
naturally wanted to follow in the footsteps of those who had sacrificed their lives fighting to 
establish the PRC by contributing to nation construction (Jun Fen 1961). After graduating 
from secondary school, Lei Feng responded to Party calls for volunteers to accelerate 
agricultural production, being honoured as a ‘labour model’ for his outstanding service. In 
1958, he learnt to drive a tractor and later participated in projects to dam a river in Hunan 
Province, and accelerate mining and steel production in Liaoning Province. In 1960, he 
joined the PLA and then the CCP. As a peace-time soldier, Lei Feng committed his life to 
alleviating the hardships experienced by the Chinese people. Anecdotes about him indicate 
that he worked hard, lived frugally and, apart from buying and reading Mao’s publications, 
gave his earnings to local Party projects and helped people in need. In the words attributed to 
Lei Feng: ‘The Party is my family, the people are my family’ (Jun Fen 1961). 
 
Following a second article on 25 January 1963, which stated that Lei Feng had died in an 
accident on 15 August 1962, aged 22 (‘Guofangbu pizhuan’ 1963), Lei Feng became the 
feature of a six-page-long edition of the People’s Daily on 7 February 1963. The front-page 
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editorial enjoins its readers to ‘Be Clear About What to Love and What to Hate’ by joining a 
movement to commemorate Lei Feng, which was gathering pace in military areas of Liaoning 
by people who knew him or had heard about him (‘Ai zeng fenming’ 1963). Other reports 
add that Lei Feng’s revolutionary spirit, as exemplified by many small acts of kindness to 
others, will live forever in people’s hearts. They encourage readers to be like Lei Feng – ‘a 
rustless screw’ devoted to serving the people and the socialist cause, and constantly 
heightening one’s proletarian class consciousness through the diligent study of Marxism-
Leninism-Maoism (‘Weida de putong yi bing’ 1963).  
 
Diary excerpts attributed to Lei Feng state that: ‘After studying the four volumes of Mao 
Zedong’s Selected Works, I now truly understand what kind of a man I should be and what I 
am living for: I live to improve the lives of others’. Another entry says: ‘I live to serve the 
people wholeheartedly, that is, to struggle for the liberation of humankind/communism’ 
(Zhen, Tong and Lei 1963: 2). Yet another famous entry highlights the dual nature of Lei 
Feng as a model of how to behave towards friends and enemies. It enjoins people to ‘treat 
comrades like the breeze in spring, treat work with enthusiasm like hot summer sunshine, 
treat individualism like the autumn breeze sweeping away withered leaves, and treat the 
enemy as ruthlessly as the cold winter’ (Liaoning ribao 1963). 
 
The next front-page article about Lei Feng in the People’s Daily is dated 5 March 1963 – 5 
March is now known in China as Lei Feng Day, with 1963 being cited retrospectively as the 
first year of a more than 50 year-long tradition (‘Zhongguo qingnian chuban’ 1963). It notes 
that the China Youth Magazine had issued an album on learning from Lei Feng, containing 
calligraphic inscriptions about Lei Feng by Chairman Mao and other CCP leaders, and an 
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excerpted Diary of Lei Feng. The article concluded that Mao’s inscription, ‘Learn from 
Comrade Lei Feng’, would undoubtedly attract an enthusiastic response. 
 
Mao’s call to ‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’ became what the CPC Encyclopedia (1995–
2014) describes as ‘an atomic bomb in everyone’s brain’, as PRC citizens were mobilized to 
participate in a nationwide campaign to become ‘living Lei Fengs’. On 8 March 1963, the 
China Federation of Trade Unions issued a notice calling for workplaces to implement 
activities for workers and their families to learn from Lei Feng how to behave towards others 
(‘Quanguo zonggonghui’ 1963). The PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House published a 
document to assist with this process in April called The Diary of Lei Feng 1959−1962 (Lei 
Feng Riji 1959−1962 1963). Lei Feng was the subject of two songs composed in 1963: 
‘Learn From Lei Feng, the Good Role Model’ and ‘Take Up Lei Feng’s Gun’ (Ren and Ren 
1990; ‘Jieguo Lei Feng de qiang’ 2009). The August First Film Studio released a feature film, 
Lei Feng, in March 1965 (dir. Dong Zhaoqi 1964). Commemorative Lei Feng Memorial 
Halls were built in Liaoning Province in 1964 and Hunan Province in 1968 (Lei Feng 
Memorial Hall of Hunan China n.d.; ‘Shenyang junqu’ 2009). 
 
Thus, by the start of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), Lei Feng had been presented via 
mass media and mobilization activities as the epitome of socialist personhood – altruistic, 
diligent, thrifty, self-effacing and motivated by love of the CCP, the PRC and the Chinese 
people, as demonstrated by his thoughts and deeds as represented in his diary. Lei’s self-
enforced austerity and willingness to help others is illustrated in diary entries recording how 
he gave money and food to a fellow soldier when he heard that his colleague’s mother was ill, 
but he had no money to return home or to buy her food (Qi and Xu 2006: 115), and in entries 
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recording his willingness to darn his colleagues’ socks and tattered clothing. An entry dated 
15 October 1961 presents this ‘selfless’ revolutionary ethos as heroic: 
Sunday today. I didn’t go out; instead I washed 5 mattresses for the comrades in my 
squad, repaired Gao Kuiyun’s bedcover, assisted the cooks to wash more than 600 
catties of cabbage, swept inside and outside the room, and other things. … In all, I’ve 
done what I should have done. I’m tired but happy. … It’s glorious to be a nameless 
hero. (Qi and Xu 2006: 150) 
This representation of Lei Feng was altered by the Cultural Revolution and subsequently by 
the CCP’s negation of revolutionary Maoism in 1981. 
 
From revolutionary to civic-minded citizen 
 
In 1966, Lei Feng symbolized devotion to Mao Zedong and continuous revolution, an 
obvious contrast with early depictions of him as a model of revolutionary class unity and 
more recent depictions of him as simply a civic-minded citizen. A front-page article in the 
People’s Daily dated 5 December describes how 2.5 million Red Guards had come to Beijing 
to see Chairman Mao (‘Jiefangjun zhanshi’ 1966). The Red Guards refer to a youth 
paramilitary social movement formed after Mao called on Chinese youth in mid-1966 to take 
the revolution to a new stage, by opposing those persons within the Party in positions of 
bureaucratic authority who were compromising the revolution by taking ‘the capitalist road’, 
or ‘enemies’ masquerading as ‘friends’. The article provides stories about the Red Guards’ 
acts of public service and praises them as reliable revolutionary successors, citing their 
familiarity with Mao Zedong’s ideas and Lei Feng’s deeds, and love of everything associated 
with the word ‘public’ (proletarian) (公), and opposition to the word ‘private’ (capitalism) 
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(私) (‘Jiefangjun zhanshi’ 1966). Front-page stories in the People’s Daily on 5 March in 1970 
and 1973 similarly call on young people in urban workplaces and agricultural collectives to 
learn from Lei Feng how to distinguish between the correct (Maoist) class line of continuous 
revolution and the revisionist line of capitalist restoration (‘Ba Maozhuxi’ 1970; ‘Relie 
xiangying weida’ 1973). 
 
Publicity about Lei Feng then diminished until after Mao’s death, when Lei Feng became a 
part of the 1977 campaign to promote the PRC’s new leader, Hua Guofeng, and to condemn 
the main proponents of continuous revolution – the Gang of Four – as counter-revolutionaries. 
A front-page article in the People’s Daily on 5 March presents a calligraphic inscription by 
Hua Guofeng urging Chinese youth to ‘Learn from Lei Feng’, adding that his spirit of modest 
altruism offered a powerful critique of the publicity-grabbing and power-hungry Gang 
(Renmin Ribao, Hongqi Zazhi 1977). Another article dated 12 November accuses the Gang 
of ‘killing’ Lei Feng (Liaoningsheng junqu zhengzhi pipanzu 1977). It explains that Deng 
Xiaoping (PRC leader after Hua Guofeng) had overheard an old man declaring that Lei was 
dead, when he saw soldiers sitting on a public bus while women and children were standing. 
The article attributes this lack of civility to the Gang’s control over the media and promotion 
of antagonistic class struggle to obtain power. It also accuses the Gang of falsely denouncing 
veteran leaders and slandering them as Lei Feng-style ‘empty-headed screws’. It concludes 
that after the Gang’s arrest, people had seen new examples of ‘living Lei Fengs’ on the streets 
and were joyfully declaring that ‘Uncle Lei Feng is back!’ Lei Feng is used in this context to 
epitomize friendship and civility against the enmity generated by the Gang of Four. 
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Lei Feng’s image was therefore revived along with the CCP’s negation of the Cultural 
Revolution, which was associated with the Gang of Four, and dissociated (to some extent) 
from Mao, in an attempt to reclaim some of the CCP’s earlier standing as the vanguard party. 
Maoist concepts of continuous revolution and capitalist roaders directly undermined the 
Party’s legitimacy by challenging understandings of the vanguard party as automatically 
taking the revolution forward towards socialism and serving the interests of the people. The 
practical indeterminacy of these concepts also meant that the Cultural Revolution quickly 
descended into factional-fighting. As ‘citizen-friends’ sought to identify their ‘enemies’, 
amorphously defined as people without a correct proletarian class consciousness, the 
allocation of class identity became a matter of political and social rivalries (Blecher 1986: 
143). A large proportion of Party members were accused of following the capitalist road at 
one stage or another; many people were accused of being capitalist roaders because other 
people wanted their jobs or state-allocated homes; and even the Red Guards fought each other 
to prove that one group or another had a better understanding of Mao Zedong Thought. In 
short, the praxis of the Cultural Revolution exposed the unstable nature of Marxist-Leninist-
Maoist concepts of class as a definitional category and basis for collective social action. 
 
Lei Feng was further dissociated from radical Maoism along with the PRC’s post-1978 
adoption of market-based economic reforms, also known as ‘socialism with Chinese 
characteristics’ (Deng Xiaoping 1983). In February 1981, shortly after the Gang were 
sentenced to life-imprisonment, the People’s Daily ran a front-page article stating that the 
Communist Youth League was encouraging widespread publicity of Lei Feng activities to 
promote ‘socialist spiritual civilization’ (‘Changdao gongchan zhuyi’ 1981). This concept, 
first articulated by Deng Xiaoping in 1979, refers to the goal of upholding core socialist 
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values, while developing a market economy, and is associated with government efforts to 
promote political stability and ethical-cultural development in the context of rapid social 
change (Deng Xiaoping 1979; see also Cartier, in this book). 
 
The penultimate peak in official Lei Feng publicity occurred in 1990, following the 
suppression of student-worker protests in China, and the collapse of the Berlin Wall (and 
ultimately the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe), in mid-to-late 1989. On 5 March 
1990, the People’s Daily ran a front-page article calling on the nation to learn from Lei Feng 
how to build socialism with Chinese characteristics (‘Zhongyang haozhao’ 1990). This was 
preceded by a January ‘Notice’ from the Communist Youth League calling on Party and 
youth organizations to promote a nationwide campaign for young people to learn from Lei 
Feng, persist with the socialist road and combat ‘bourgeois liberalization/spiritual pollution’ 
(‘Gongqingtuanzhongyang’ 1990). The latter terms referred to combatting the perceived 
negative consequences of China’s initial opening up to the rest of the world, including new 
social problems such as crime and calls for political democratization. 
 
On 5 March 1993, the People’s Daily ran another front-page article about Lei Feng stating 
that Hu Jintao (then president of the CCP Central Party School, subsequently PRC President 
2003–2013) had given a speech commemorating the thirtieth anniversary of Mao’s call to 
‘Learn from Comrade Lei Feng’ (‘Zai jinian Mao Zedong’ 1993). Hu declared that every 
citizen who wished to contribute to China’s rejuvenation could do so by learning from Lei 
Feng – an ordinary yet extraordinary ‘anybody’. He added that a supportive public 
environment and incentive mechanisms (awards) were required to foster a new generation of 
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Lei Fengs –people with the patriotic socialist habits of austerity, hard work and ardent 
‘rustless-screw-style’ innovation. 
 
Hu’s invocation of the first Lei Feng Day gestured towards historical continuity, while 
highlighting a more delimited use of Lei Feng as a civic-minded citizen that retained a 
connection with the Maoist past in terms of generic core values, but was dissociated from 
revolutionary class politics. ‘Learning from Lei Feng’ was no longer about helping others to 
demonstrate and forge class solidarity. Rather, it had been remoulded as a means of 
cultivating people with the civic virtues required to modernize new ‘New China’. These 
virtues – patriotism, altruism, frugality, hard work and innovation – derive from the Mao-era 
experimental (mass line) mode of government policy and practice that mobilized the Chinese 
people to transform the state of things, while using the least possible material resources. 
However, both the substance of those virtues and who embodies them have been transformed 
in the reform period. 
 
Commercialization and entry into popular culture 
 
Along with the PRC’s development of a consumer society, Lei Feng entered the realm of 
popular culture, a transition initially shepherded by reform-era Party publicity machinery 
focused on historical-patriotic education. The Diary of Lei Feng has been reprinted in more 
than 200 editions, many of which are collector’s items (Zhang Jun 2007). The Lei Feng 
Memorial Halls are now revolutionary tourism sites. To mark the PRC’s sixtieth anniversary 
in 2009, the 1960s Lei Feng film was rereleased as a DVD and repackaged as part of a 
collection of ‘red cinema classics’ (‘Lei Feng (DVD)’ n.d.). An animation series, called ‘The 
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Story of Lei Feng’, went to air on 1 June 2009 on China’s Network Television to coincide 
with International Children’s Day (‘Lei Feng de gushi’ n.d.). A television series called Lei 
Feng also aired in 2009, casting Olympic diver Tian Liang as Lei Feng. This casting choice 
attracted controversy, with many people, including some of Lei Feng’s ‘former military 
colleagues’ reportedly considering Tian an inappropriate stand-in for the ‘real’ Lei Feng 
because he is a ‘womanizing big spender’ (‘70 wei Lei Feng zhanyou’ 2009; ‘Jilü cha feiwen’ 
2009). Such debate highlights the continued investment of the Party-state and/or certain 
sectors of the Chinese populace in authorizing public understandings of an authentic Lei Feng. 
 
Lei Feng is the subject of an official Lei Feng website (www.chinaleifeng.com/), which went 
live in May 2012 to mark the fiftieth anniversary of his death. The website provides up-to-
date ‘news’ about Lei Feng and Lei Feng activities, and has interactive forums such as blogs, 
telephone hotlines and bulletin boards. Lei Feng has even been reinvented by Party publicists 
as an award-winning cartoon superhero, ‘Lei Feng Knight’, who helps others and gives out 
Christmas presents (Pan and Qu 2014; see Figure 3.3). 
 
<Figure 3.3: Lei Feng Knight as Father Christmas> 
Source: Photograph by Su Xuezhong, Hunan Lei Feng Memorial Hall, 2013. 
 
Today, Lei Feng hats, t-shirts, bags, badges and posters, can be bought at markets and tourist 
sites across China, and through multiple online stores; many of these products display Mao-
era political slogans that have ongoing relevance in the present, whether celebratory or 
satirical. Such items often display an image of Lei Feng above a slogan in red Chinese 
characters which says: ‘Serve the People’. That slogan was used during the Mao era to 
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underscore the goal of the revolution and was used by President Hu Jintao to describe one of 
the ‘eight rules of conduct’ of contemporary Party officials. The other rules reiterate the Lei 
Feng-Maoist ethos – love China, be diligent, be honest, live plainly and help others, although 
‘follow Mao’ has been replaced with ‘be law-abiding’ and ‘follow science’ (‘New moral 
yardstick’ 2006). 
 
One enterprising Chinese condom manufacturer has used Lei Feng iconography to sell packs 
of condoms (Mitchell 2006). The boxed sets contain a classic image of Lei Feng and the 
textual injunction to ‘Learn from Lei Feng’. When asked about the logic of using Lei Feng’s 
visage to sell condoms, the manufacturer replied: 
Lei Feng would have supported safe sexual conduct and responsible family planning, 
I believe. And his condoms are stronger than his socks. He would not need to repair 
them. (cited in Mitchell 2006). 
 
Multiple versions of Lei Feng are celebrated and parodied in other commercial forms. Singer 
Xue Cun (2013) became famous briefly in the early 2000s for a folk-pop song circulated 
online with humorous animation called ‘All North-Eastern Chinese are Living Lei Fengs. 
Designer Zhang Liang has created a commercially successful series of cuddly ‘red dolls’ 
comprised of a ‘little Lei Feng’ and his fictitious ‘family members’ (Li Muyang 2012). Artist 
Dai Xiang (2012) has created a microblog called the ‘New Story of Lei Feng’, which contains 
photoshopped pictures of a doll of Lei Feng in contemporary settings: removing graffiti, 
reading Mao’s works in McDonald’s, and appearing in commercial advertisements. In 
interview, Dai stated that his creation of a ‘living Lei Feng’ aimed to encourage people to 
reflect on what Lei Feng meant to them personally. In his words: ‘Most people know about 
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Lei from political propaganda. However, independent thinking allows us to decide what Lei 
means to us now’ (Dai Xiang 2012). 
 
Such independent thinking has included making Lei Feng a part of China’s ‘spoof’ culture – 
a largely youth-based subculture of user-generated media production, which typically 
involves the remixing and parodying of established works, especially photoshopping and 
circulating comical images. One such poster satirizes the reform-era slogan ‘Let Some People 
Get Rich First’ by photoshopping a 1960s image of Lei Feng washing an army truck, 
removing the truck and substituting a Ferrari (‘Dangdai Lei Feng de biaozhun’ n.d.). The 
Chinese words beneath the image translate as: ‘Today’s Lei Feng: The Most Glorious Thing 
in the World is to be Rich and the Most Glorious People are Rich People’. The use of Lei 
Feng’s image here can be read ambiguously as supporting or criticizing the ‘affluent 
materialism’ of contemporary Chinese consumers, when compared to Lei Feng’s famed 
frugality and the egalitarian poverty of the Mao era. 
 
In 2012, Hu Xijin, the editor of the Global Times, reposted a spoof image on his Twitter-like 
Weibo microblog of two contemporary political icons photoshopped into Lei Feng images – 
the artist Ai Weiwei, known for his criticisms of the PRC Government’s stance on democracy 
and human rights, and academic Kong Qingdong, known for his anti-western, anti-capitalist 
and anti-economic reform views. While claiming to be saddened by the use of Lei Feng 
iconography in this context, Hu concluded that: ‘The louder the volume of the government 
campaign to study Lei Feng, the more such spoofs will be enthusiastically circulated online’ 
(cited in Goldkorn 2012). 
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The popularity of such spoofs contradicts the internet witticism that: ‘Early generations of 
PRC citizens learnt from Lei Feng, subsequent generations (1989ers) revolted against him, 
and people born in and after the 1990s have forgotten him’ (see Mattis 2012). China’s 
Internet users – the largest online population in the world – are predominantly young and 
educated (China Internet Network Information Center 2014). While netizens sometimes 
present their spoofs as active acts of resistance to the Party-state, many are simply having 
‘fun’. Irrespective of whether they are intended as critique or entertainment, Lei Feng spoofs 
contribute to the flow of mutating imagery and narratives about Lei Feng, amplifying the 
repetitive force of associated government advertising aimed at generating support for generic 
nation-unifying tasks (developing the economy, promoting national pride through 
commemorative and celebratory events, and building community and civic behaviours). 
 
In short, the images and life-stories associated with the figure of Lei Feng have become part 
of contemporary popular and consumer culture, whereby texts from multiple media 
collectively create a public profile of a ‘living Lei Feng’ that is no longer under the exclusive 
control of any individual or institution, including the PRC Government. Although Lei Feng 
came to fame through the Party-state propaganda machinery, commercial media processes 
have turned him into a celebrity by providing the means to recreate and circulate multiple 
new stories about him. As Lei Feng gradually became objectified and imprinted with new 
interpretations, it also became possible for the Party-state publicity machinery to adapt him to 
serve new social functions. The flexible nature of Lei Feng’s postsocialist celebrity is 
underscored by the recent government use of Lei Feng as the ‘face’ of a national campaign to 
promote contemporary civic behaviours, especially volunteering. 
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Lei Feng’s revival as the celebrity face of a government campaign to promote volunteering in 
2012–2013 aimed to draw large groups of young people into planning for the PRC’s future, 
while commemorating its history. Volunteering – defined by the PRC Government as the not-
for-profit giving of time, intellect, strength and skills, to support public benefit activities and 
promote social harmony – has been a growing focus of Chinese public policy since the late 
1980s (‘Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC’ 2013). In 1987, the Ministry of Civil Affairs 
advocated organizing community-based volunteer services for disadvantaged urban residents 
(Li Maoping 2012: 28). In 1994, the national China Young Volunteers Association was 
established under the Chinese Communist Youth League’s leadership to promote 
volunteering and provide services for people in need. The PRC’s Ninth Five-Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (1996–2000) and Summary of the 2010 Long-
term Objectives proposed expanding community-based volunteering (‘Zhonghua renmin 
gongheguo’ 1996). By 2013, China had an estimated 40 million registered volunteers, 
mobilized in part as a result of natural disasters and mega-events such as the 2008 Sichuan 
Earthquake and Beijing Olympics (‘Yao Ming huo guoji zhiyuanzhe’ 2014; see also Cartier 
and Hoffman, in this book). 
 
The newfound importance ascribed by the government to volunteering is confirmed by the 
‘China Social Services Volunteer Team Building Guidelines for 2013–2020’, which advocate 
that registered volunteers should comprise 10 per cent of China’s population by 2020 
(‘Ministry of Civil Affairs of the PRC’ 2013). Registered volunteer organizations are 
organized and mobilized by government departments and Communist Party committees, 
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including the Communist Youth League Committees and Young Volunteer Associations, 
through coordination with community, non-profit and business organizations (United Nations 
Development Programme 2011). The expansion of volunteering in the PRC thus aims to 
incentivize individuals and community and non-profit organizations to work with the state, 
rather than independently of it, to develop a regulated philanthropic sector that will 
complement government-provided welfare services by 2020 (Guowuyuan 2014). 
 
Lei Feng was first enlisted in a high-profile fashion as the face of government efforts to 
promote a philanthropic culture in 2000, when the Central Committee of the Communist 
Youth League and the Young Volunteers Association renamed Lei Feng Day ‘China Youth 
Volunteer Service Day’ (‘Zhongguo qingnian zhiyuan fuwuri’ 2012). This action linked Lei 
to the UN International Volunteer Day and Millennium development goals, which include 
eradicating extreme poverty, combatting AIDS and Malaria, and ensuring environmental 
sustainability. Thus, it connected Lei Feng to new programs of domestic and international 
governance. 
 
In March 2012, the CCP Central Committee Office released a document called ‘Suggestions 
on Enhancing Efforts to Learn from Lei Feng’, stating that local communities and residents 
should be encouraged to provide volunteer services following Lei Feng’s example of helping 
others, reflecting ‘traditional Chinese virtues’ and based on love of the CCP, China, socialism, 
and the Chinese people (‘Zhonggong zhongyang bangongting yinfa’ 2012). The document 
urged Party organizations and local and provincial-level governments to organize diverse Lei 
Feng activities using multiple media forms. Examples included: biannual awards to recognize 
outstanding community service; prizes for volunteer-themed student essays, theatre and 
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exhibitions; promoting the Lei Feng Memorial Halls; using art, film, television, literature, the 
internet and mobile phones, to spread the ‘Lei Feng Spirit’; and promoting Lei Feng activities 
in workplaces, shopping malls and transport hubs, etc. As a result, images of Lei Feng and 
endorsements to ‘Learn from Lei Feng’ could be observed through the PRC in 2012–2013. 
 
Government advertising for the campaign drew on Lei Feng iconography and symbolism, but 
also encouraged China’s citizens to express universal love and empower themselves as 
‘global’ self-governing individuals, rather than to demonstrate revolutionary solidarity 
through individual sacrifice. For example, the PRC’s Publicity and Information Department, 
the State Administration for Industry and Commerce, the State Administration of Radio, Film 
and Television, and the General Administration of Press and Publication, issued a series of 12 
poster-style public service advertisements (PSAs) titled ‘Be Civic-Minded and Create a New 
Trend’ (jiangwenming shuxinfeng 讲文明树新风). The first poster celebrates the 50 years 
since Lei Feng’s death with the slogan ‘Lei Feng Will Always Be With Us (1962–2012)’, 
ascribing a ubiquitous aspect to the Lei Feng spirit (Lei Feng yizhi zai women shenbian 雷锋
一直在我们身边 1962–2012). It juxtaposes a classic 1960s image of Lei Feng with images 
of contemporary doctors and nurses giving elderly people free health checks at Community 
Lei Feng Service Sites (‘Renmin ribao kandeng de’ 2012). 
 
Other posters in the series link Lei Feng to environmental concerns and concepts of 
compassion presented as a Chinese and universal human attribute. One poster displays an 
image of university-student volunteers against a leafy backdrop conducting water quality 
tests and planting a tree. A slogan emblazoned in large characters at the top of the poster says: 
‘Caring for Nature Requires Everyone’s Help’. Beneath this message, in smaller characters, 
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is the slogan ‘Learn from Lei Feng, Contribute to the Lives of Others, Improve Yourself’ 
(Xuexi Lei Feng: Fengxian taren tisheng ziji 学习雷锋 奉献他人 提升自己). Yet another 
poster shows an image of two hands holding a heart-shaped photograph of contemporary 
volunteers – a visual symbol of compassion and philanthropy – against a blue and green 
backdrop signifying an environmentally clean and beautiful China. The slogan ‘Learn from 
Lei Feng: Contribute to the Lives of Others; Improve Yourself’ is placed beneath the image. 
Other posters produced by local governments used similar slogans and used modern, stylized 
representations of Lei Feng, or evoked him by name and through visual metonymy, such as in 
brightly-coloured prints of young, happy people wearing Lei Feng hats (‘Guangzhou xuyao 
qianwan ge Lei Feng’ 2013). 
 
The posters reveal an effort to reshape and update the figure of Lei Feng to encourage 
Chinese citizens to volunteer to meet new social imperatives. While appealing to Mao-era 
traditions of altruistic public service, they introduce a focus on self-improvement and self-
fulfilment that differs from the socialist ethos of the original Lei Feng campaign. The 
message of the original campaign was about working selflessly for the good of society and 
even abolishing the self from civil acts. When the diary version of Lei Feng revels in the 
glory of being a ‘nameless hero’, he does so in the spirit of a hard-nosed form of socialism in 
which the individual is literally irrelevant – only the good of society matters. In contrast, the 
message of the new publicity materials is that one can help others and help oneself at the 
same time. The materials encourage people to contribute voluntarily to public welfare in the 
context of a more open and complex society, one where the Party-state has reduced capacity 
to compel individuals to pursue its goals through mass mobilization activities, and 
consequently has to use new governing strategies to encourage responsible citizenship. 
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The ‘carrot’ for volunteering is self-enhancement in the sense of ‘feeling good’ about helping 
others, and in the practical sense of ‘self-entrepreneurialism’ – that is, acquiring experiences 
and skills that may enhance one’s career opportunities in a competitive job market 
(‘Daxuesheng wei qiuzhi er zuo zhiyuanzhe’ 2013). These inducements reiterate the standard 
rationales for youth volunteering in western societies, which is to meet people, have fun and 
improve their career prospects (Case Foundation 2006: 6). While arguably introducing 
neoliberal forms of governance, the government-led promotion of such rationales also turns 
on the general impetus of reform-era education, which is for young people to become ‘good 
(socialist) citizens’ by improving their personal capacities or qualities (suzhi 素质) (see 
Woronov and Yu, in this book). 
 
Figure 3.4 shows one of series of posters posted on residential noticeboards in Chaoyang 
District, Beijing, urging young people to ‘improve themselves’ during the summer holidays 
by following Lei Feng’s example and promoting the ‘Beijing Spirit’, that is, by practising 
‘traditional-socialist’ Chinese virtues (helping others) and fostering patriotic, innovative, 
inclusive and ethical ‘new’ trends (civic behaviours and volunteerism) (‘Guanyu shujia qijian 
kaizhan’ 2012). One of two images portrays a girl helping to maintain a clean and 
ecologically-friendly urban living environment; she is described as a ‘Youth Environmental 
Protection Guard’. In the other image, the same girl is portrayed standing at the entrance of a 
block of residential apartments; she is described as a ‘[Residential] Community Building 
Doorkeeper’, meaning she is watching the neighbourhood and ready to provide assistance 
when needed. A slogan below the images urges young people to ‘Be Ethical People and 
Learn from Lei Feng; Be a Young Emissary for Community Civilization’. To the right of the 
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slogan is a badge-like circle which displays an image of Lei Feng shining like a rising sun 
above two children to guide them. Local schools were encouraged to submit stories about 
exceptional ‘Emissaries’ to the District Spiritual Civilization Office for awards (‘Guanyu 
shujia qijian kaizhan’ 2012). 
 
Figure 3.4: Be an Ethical Person; Learn from Lei Feng How to be a Young Emissary for 
Community Civilization 
Source: Photograph by Elaine Jeffreys, Chaoyang District, Beijing, 2012. 
 
As the preceding discussion suggests, Lei Feng’s image and persona has been released from 
the burdens of political-ideological consistency with Maoist tenets, turning him into a 
heterogeneous symbol of social action. The use of Lei Feng in the 2012–2013 government 
communication campaign legitimizes efforts to promote philanthropy by linking 
volunteerism to a historical tradition unique to the PRC and the CCP, when charity was once 
viewed in Marxist terms as means by which the propertied classes attempted to placate the 
labouring classes (Zhou and Zeng 2006: 368). The government advertising also appeals to 
diverse Chinese cultural forms (traditional, socialist and reform-era concepts of suzhi) and 
elements of ‘neoliberal’ governing discourses (civic pride, self-empowerment and 
autonomous, participatory citizenship). This coupling of ‘socialist’ and ‘neoliberal’ rationales 
for volunteering is not necessarily experienced by targeted audiences as incongruous because 
volunteerism and ‘doing good’ involve people and affect. They refer to heterogeneous spaces 
for social action and self-making, rather than self-evident actions (see also Hoffman, in this 
book). 
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The use of Lei Feng in this context therefore denotes a sense of cultural continuity with forms 
of citizenship that are claimed to already exist but which in fact are actually being created. 
Two examples that illustrate this point are: the new links forged between Lei Feng and 
entrepreneurs; and, university students’ reflections on Lei Feng-related volunteering activities 
and the contemporary value and use of Lei Feng. 
 
Entrepreneurs and philanthropy 
 
The heterogeneous spaces for social action and self-making brought into play by the revived 
governmental use of Lei Feng are underscored by the new links forged between Lei Feng and 
entrepreneurs. The title of a ‘living Lei Feng’ was first used in 1963 to refer to PLA soldiers 
who assisted with agricultural production (‘Jiefangjun dali zhiyuan’ 1963). It was 
subsequently used as a positive appellation to refer to members of the revolutionary classes – 
workers, cadres, peasants and soldiers – who worked to help each other as ‘citizen-friends’ of 
socialist China. 
 
The title of a ‘living Lei Feng’ was not associated with entrepreneurs historically because 
private wealth was a target of active political hostility in the PRC until Deng Xiaoping’s 
advocacy of the slogan ‘Let One Segment of the Population Get Rich First and Guide Others 
Along the Way’, and Jiang Zemin’s advocacy of the ‘Three Represents’ theory, which 
welcomes entrepreneurs into the ranks of the CCP. According to Jiang Zemin (PRC President 
1993–2003), the Three Represents is about ‘blazing new trails for the development of Marxist 
theory’: it means uniting with the innovative, advanced productive forces to make China 
strong and the Chinese people rich (Jiang Zemin 2002). Members of this group include: free-
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lance professionals, private entrepreneurs, managerial and technical staff employed by non-
public and overseas-funded enterprises, and CEOs of state-owned enterprises. Jiang 
concluded that ‘the people’ should unite with entrepreneurs because ‘it is improper to judge 
whether people are politically progressive or backward simply by whether they own property 
or how much property they own’. Instead of equating personal wealth with political 
incorrectness, Jiang (2002) suggested that the Chinese public should judge the newly rich 
based on how their work contributes to the goal of building socialism with Chinese 
characteristics. 
 
The official endorsement of entrepreneurship has been followed by a more recent equation of 
philanthropy with socialist construction, demonstrated by the creation of Lei Feng titles and 
awards to CEOs to recognize their public service. On 27 February 2013, a ceremony attended 
by senior government and military officials was held in Beijing to commemorate the fiftieth 
anniversary of Mao’s call to ‘Learn from Lei Feng’, and acknowledge the outstanding public 
service of 50 people, by presenting them with the PRC’s first national ‘Lei Feng Awards’ (Li 
Haixiu 2013). The ceremony was part of a symposium on ‘Normalizing Learning from Lei 
Feng Activities’, launched through collaborations between government- and corporate-
funded foundations, and supported by state-run media. 
 
President Xi Jinping described Lei Feng and two award winners (Luo Yang and Guo Mingyi) 
as ‘the backbone of China’ during one of his incoming speeches to the National People’s 
Congress in 2013, stating that more ‘Lei Fengs’ were needed to achieve the ‘China Dream’ of 
rejuvenating China and achieving ever-higher living standards (‘Xi Jinping: Lei Feng’ 2013). 
Luo Yang, CEO of the state-run Shenyang Aircraft Corporation Logistics Equipment 
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Company, received a posthumous award for innovating military aviation technology. Guo 
Mingyi, a miner, was awarded for a history of starting work early, donating blood and 
donating to good causes despite his low income (Li Haixiu 2013). 
 
While these awardees belong to the ‘friend’ tradition of good cadres and workers, Cao 
Dewang, a rags-to-riches private entrepreneur and philanthropist, also received a national Lei 
Feng award. Chief Executive of Fuyao Glass, Cao Dewang has an estimated net worth of 
USD 1.2 billion (Zeveloff 2012). He has received numerous awards for donating USD 800 
million to philanthropic causes since 1983, including ‘China’s Best Corporate Citizen’ in 
2005 and China’s ‘Top Philanthropist’ in 2011 (‘Cao Dewang jianli’ n.d.). He has also been 
called a ‘new-era living Lei Feng’ by China’s media (Tian 2011). 
 
Other members of China’s newly rich elite have claimed the aura of a ‘living Lei Feng’ for 
themselves. Real estate magnate and philanthropist, Pan Shiyi (2012) describes China’s first 
generation of super-rich entrepreneurs as ‘living Lei Fengs’ for working hard to drive the 
Chinese economy and providing everybody with the opportunity for private wealth creation. 
In 2012, billionaire-philanthropist Chen Guangbiao attracted controversy for posting 
photographs of himself dressed as Lei Feng on his microblog (‘Chen Guangbiao toudai’ 
2012). These representations of CEOs as ‘living Lei Fengs’ arguably embody the neoliberal 
imperative that individual competition for wealth and influence, rather than collective class 
struggle and selfless devotion to others, is the key to improving oneself and the commonweal.  
 
However, public discussions of Chen Guangbiao’s ‘Lei Feng photo-shoot’ demonstrate that 
contemporary presentations of Lei Feng provide opportunities for individuals to debate the 
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conduct of others and to modify their own conduct. Chen told reporters that when he agreed 
to do a photo-shoot with artist Shu Yong, he had no idea that Shu wished him to pose as Lei 
Feng; he had agreed to the request because he admired and tried to practice Lei’s spirit of 
dedication to the Chinese people (‘Chen Guangbiao toudai’ 2012). Shu Yong claimed that the 
photographs aimed to parody neither Chen nor Lei, but rather to promote public discussions 
of contemporary understandings of the ‘spirit of Lei Feng’. In responses to the photographs, 
which were widely circulated on the Chinese internet precisely because they were viewed as 
‘funny’, some netizens described Chen Guangbiao’ as a ‘living Lei Feng’. Others condemned 
him as ‘a rich show-off’. Yet others argued that Chen Guangbiao is a publicity-seeking 
narcissist, but one whose activities may nevertheless help to counter the perceived ‘uncaring’ 
individualism of contemporary China by encouraging other people to help other people 
(‘Chen Guangbiao “Lei Feng zhao”’ 2012; Lei Juanli 2012). 
 
In short, Party and government organizations have proved keen to raise the public profile of 
entrepreneurs as ‘friends of the people’, and some CEOs have proved equally keen to label 
themselves as ‘living Lei Fengs’, whether to promote their philanthropy or justify their right 
to be rich first. Such actions aim to counter the legacy of Mao-era class politics, which linger 
on in counter-claims that CEOs cannot be ‘living Lei Fengs’, because their wealth is derived 
from corruption rather than hard work (Wu Zhifeng 2012). However, such claims are 
unlikely to be translated into calls for collective class action because of the perceived ‘failure’ 
of Maoist politics and growing acceptance of new ideas about how to promote the common 
good, as demonstrated by student survey responses. 
 
Student reflections on volunteering and Lei Feng 
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In late 2013, we conducted an online multiple-choice survey of Chinese university students 
with a view to understanding the extent of student participation in Lei Feng-related 
volunteering activities and to shed light on the function and public reception of Lei Feng.
2
 
The survey was not undertaken with the aim of providing a definitive or scientific account of 
Lei Feng’s audience reception. The 415 respondents to the survey came from three Chinese 
universities: a top-tier university in Beijing; and technology and teacher-training universities 
in Hebei and Yunnan Province. Students majored in a range of subjects: 60 per cent in 
Science or Engineering; 25 per cent in humanities (mainly languages); 12 per cent in 
administration or commerce. Nearly 96 per cent were under 30 years of age and hence in the 
age group that might be expected to have ‘forgotten Lei Feng’. 
 
The survey responses indicate that volunteering is a common experience for young people in 
China, largely in the context of Lei Feng activities organized by schools and universities. 
Most respondents (86 per cent) had participated in volunteering activities, with most of these 
activities being linked to Lei Feng. Moreover, nearly 80 per cent of respondents said that 
their volunteering experiences had been organized by a school or university. 
 
However, it appears that volunteering around Lei Feng Day is not compulsory, even for 
school children. Around a quarter of the total sample had not engaged in Lei Feng activities. 
While around one-fifth of survey respondents indicated that they regularly participated in Lei 
Feng Day activities, two-thirds said they rarely participated in Lei Feng activities. Only 2 per 
cent indicated that they had never participated in Lei Feng Day activities, but only 4 per cent 
Elaine Jeffreys and Su Xuezhong (2016) ‘Governing through Lei Feng: A Mao-era role model in 
reform-era China’, in David Bray and Elaine Jeffreys (eds) New Mentalities of Government in China, 




stated that they engaged in Lei Feng Day activities because they had no choice other than to 
participate. 
 
The survey results provide insight into how respondents conceive of Lei Feng and view the 
utility of volunteering and philanthropy. They suggest that educated young people do not 
associate Lei Feng with revolutionary politics; nor do they believe that exclusive 
government-sponsored welfare is a viable option in China today.  
 
Unsurprisingly, given government communication, the responses indicate that young 
educated people have a basic knowledge of the Lei Feng narrative, and at least one aspect of 
Lei’s persona – his legendary willingness to help others – has remained stable. Students were 
asked to identify the year of Lei Feng’s death, with options ranging from 1920 to 1990. The 
majority of respondents (68 per cent) correctly knew that Lei Feng died in 1962. The main 
facts of his life were well known: 96 per cent selected the option that he died in an accident 
and 83 per cent thought he was a member of the PLA. Around 10 per cent thought that Lei 
was a factory worker, but no one thought that he was a poet or a free thinker. Most 
respondents reported that Lei Feng’s key characteristic was a willingness to help others (90 
per cent) followed by a love of socialism (just over 7 per cent). 
 
More than half of the survey respondents did not see Lei Feng as having a class identity, 
while another 10 per cent saw class as irrelevant. Only 15 per cent thought they shared a class 
identity with Lei Feng for a reason other than that they were Chinese, while 38 per cent 
thought they shared no such identity in any sense, did not know, or thought that the idea was 
irrelevant. 
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Nearly three-quarters of respondents chose to answer the question ‘Lei Feng is …’ by picking 
the option that Lei Feng is a role model for people today. Only 13 per cent chose to answer 
that Lei Feng was a role model for people in the past; and less than 5 per cent thought that he 
was either a fictional character or an invention of Party propaganda. None of the survey 
respondents selected the option that Lei Feng was ‘nothing special’ or ‘not relevant to today’s 
China’. When asked how they would describe a ‘living Lei Feng’, the majority of students 
answered that a living Lei Feng is someone who helps others (72 per cent) or who works 
voluntarily for the Chinese people (24 per cent).  
 
Despite a poor track record of active volunteering, most of the respondents (89 per cent) 
indicated that there should be more philanthropy in China; only 2 per cent thought that 
philanthropy is unnecessary because the government should be responsible for providing 
social welfare. While 31 per cent thought that helping others and strangers should be 
voluntary, 57 per cent again thought that helping others helped themselves. Putting the 
figures together, the majority of the respondents (98 per cent) believe that helping others is 
either a form of self-help, or a voluntary and natural activity. 
 
The survey results suggest that the government use of Lei Feng to promote civic behaviours 
and volunteering has been effective in some respects. Respondents were familiar with the 
life-story of Lei Feng, who they largely appear to view as a good role model for 
contemporary civic engagement. Consistent with the redrafted official narrative, Lei Feng no 
longer appears to be tied by respondents to the Maoist revolutionary politics of class struggle 
and egalitarianism; he is tied to ideas which suggest that people should help each other and 
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look after each other, and that helping others helps oneself. As a result, Lei Feng’s image and 
persona can be associated with seemingly neoliberal conceptions of a reduced role for 
government in the provision of social welfare, and an enhanced role for individual citizens, 





Lei Feng epitomizes the changing and hybrid nature of rationalities for governing the conduct 
of others and the self in contemporary China. Lei Feng originally was a symbol of 
revolutionary class unity, being promoted by the Party-state as a ‘friend’ of the people, whose 
life and deeds demonstrated love of the CCP, the PRC, socialism and the Chinese people, and 
opposition to a common, albeit vanquished, group of ‘enemies’ – the exploitative propertied 
classes. At the start of the Cultural Revolution, he symbolized devotion to Maoism and 
continuous revolution; by the end, he symbolized opposition to the incitement of class 
struggle within the internal ranks of the people and the Party. Lei Feng has since become a 
retro-revolutionary kitsch commodity and a postsocialist celebrity who can be promoted and 
reconfigured by the PRC Government, and supporters and critics of that regime alike. In his 
latest official incarnation, Lei Feng has been employed in the service of a conception of 
government that almost evokes neoliberal ideas of ‘small government’ and an individualist 
notion of citizenship. This shift is underscored by his various uses as an incentive device for 
corporate philanthropists and the ‘face’ of a national campaign to promote volunteering. 
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The breadth and flexibility of contemporary government and popular uses of Lei Feng 
undermines claims by foreign correspondents that the state-led promotion of Lei Feng to 
encourage philanthropy represents a return to the use of a rigid ‘old-school propaganda’ that 
is destined to fail in the more open, fluid and individualistic environment of the reform period. 
Lei Feng is currently used popularly to ambiguously satirize the unequal ‘richness’ and 
individualistic materialism of contemporary China. He has been deployed by the non-state 
sector to provide a simultaneous critique of Mao-era egalitarian poverty and reform-era 
inequalities of wealth, while also being used in state-sponsored volunteering campaigns 
aimed at addressing the insufficiencies of China’s current socio-economic system, and 
creating a ‘better’ future.  
 
Repackaging Lei Feng enables the CCP to emphasize a core continuity of the socialist 
modernization project in the form of ethical citizen behaviours, even as understandings of 
modernizing China and Chinese citizenship have changed. While a symbol of revolutionary 
continuity, Lei Feng is now used officially to naturalize or domesticate inequality through 
philanthropy, rather than reinvoking the conditions that the revolution set out to overcome. 
Such dual communication seeks to legitimize one-Party rule by keeping alive the notion that 
the PRC’s history and the CCP matters. But it does so by metonymically linking Lei Feng 
with the less antagonistic, and hence potentially more persuasive, conceptions of state-society 
relations that are embedded in government advertising promoting national pride and civic 
behaviours. The irony of Lei Feng’s celebrity is that the original Lei Feng supposedly desired 
nothing more than to help others and be erased from history. 
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